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Abstract
The initial allocation of inter-provincial carbon allowances 
based on total control is a realistic way to achieve carbon 
emission reduction in China. In order to evaluate different 
distribution methods, the most important thing is to 
weigh the fairness and efficiency. This paper focuses on 
the common carbon allowance allocation methods in the 
centralized, and then measures from the four dimensions 
of cost, DEA efficiency, personal will, and fairness. 
Finally, TOPSIS is used to construct a comprehensive 
evaluation system to sort the various distribution schemes. 
The comprehensive evaluation results show that the 
comprehensive evaluation of the Nash negotiation method 
is the highest, and the comprehensive evaluation based on 
the GDP allocation method is the worst.
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INTRODUCTION
Greenhouse gas emissions and other anthropogenic drivers 
have become the main cause of climate warming since 
the mid-20th century (IPCC, 2014). Therefore, priority 
should be given to controlling carbon dioxide emissions 
to mitigate the effects of global greenhouse gases (Schuur 
et al.,2015). As the world’s largest developing country 
and the world’s largest energy consumer and carbon 
emitter, China’s emission reduction actions are of great 
significance (Jiang et al. ,2017). 
During the “Thirteenth Five-Year Plan” period (2016-
2020), China pledged to reduce its carbon dioxide 
emissions per unit of GDP by 18% by 2020 (The State 
Council, 2016). A more feasible way to achieve this 
goal is to convert the intensity target into a total target 
in stages, and then decompose the total target into each 
region (Schuur et al.,2015). There are obvious differences 
in the economic level, technical level, economic structure, 
and natural environmental conditions of various provinces 
and cities in China, which leads to different emission 
reduction potentials that can be achieved by various 
provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions. 
How to allocate carbon emission rights reasonably 
and effectively in all provinces, municipalities and 
autonomous regions becomes crucial (An et al.,2017).
The issue of carbon dioxide quota allocation has been 
widely studied academically. Many scholars have done a 
lot of research on carbon allocation methods, including 
index method, optimization method, game theory, and 
hybrid method (Zhou et al., 2016). Each method has 
its own advantages and disadvantages, and its selection 
criteria are not the same. Redistribution, all countries 
have an efficiency of 1 after allocation. At the national 
level, Li et al (2017) used the Nash negotiation model to 
analyze the reduction path of the Pearl River Delta. Pan 
et al (2014) proposed fairness in global carbon allocation 
based on the allocation of cumulative emissions per 
capita. Lin (2011) used the ZSG-DEA model to evaluate 
the EU’s 2009 carbon allowance allocation results. At the 
provincial level, Zhang (2014) combines Shapley values 
with information entropy to allocate carbon allowances in 
different parts of China. The results show that the region 
has higher GDP and higher carbon allowances, which 
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gives a certain advantage over the benchmark method 
and grandfather method. Liu (2017) builds a cost-based 
model that allocates quotas in consideration of marginal 
abatement costs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
introduces the single indicator method, the comprehensive 
indicator method, the minimization of abatement costs and 
Nash negotiation. Section 3 gives the distribution results 
of different provinces in China under different distribution 
schemes. In Section 4, the distribution plan under the 
comprehensive evaluation index system is ranked. The 
last section is a summary.
1. METHODOLOGY
1.1 Single indicator Allocation Method
To thinking the imbalance between China’s provinces and 
cities, and better embodying the principle of “common 
but differentiated responsibility”, this study selects the 
population, GDP, and historical carbon dioxide emissions 
to represent the principles of equality, efficiency, and 
feasibility. The specific principles and indicators are 
shown in Table 1.
Table 1
Allocation Principle and Indicator Selection
Principle Indicator Description
Equality Population
Equal allocation per capita ,so the 
population lager, the co2 emission 
quotas greater
Efficiency GDP co2 emission quotas are allocated in proportion to GDP 
Feasibility Historical co2 emission
co2 emission quotas are allocated 
in proportion to the Historical co2 
emission
According to the “13th Five-Year Plan” (2016 - 2020), 
the Chinese government plans to reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions per unit of GDP by 18% compared to 2015 by 
2020.
The carbon intensity CIt of the t-year is defined as:
       (1)
Among them, Qt and GDPt are the carbon dioxide 
emissions and GDP of t years respectively.
In the study, the carbon intensity of the provinces 
during the 13th Five-Year Plan period decreased by 18%. 
Therefore, the national carbon dioxide emission quota 
Q2020and the CO2 incremental quota ΔQ in 2020 can be 
calculated as:
  (2)
            (3)  
Therefore, when using the single indicator method, 
according to the population of a single indicator, GDP or 
historical carbon dioxide emissions, taking into account 
the timeliness of the proportion of the corresponding 
indicators, using the 2005-2015 data for nearly five 
years (2011- 2015) is measured by the percentage data. 
Therefore, the incremental carbon dioxide emission 
quotas for provinces and cities from 2015 to 2020 can be 
calculated using equations (4) -(6)
      (4)
Where  represents the population of the province in the 
t-th year
         (5)
represents the gross domestic product of the province 
in the t-th year
       (6)
Where represents the historical CO2 emissions of 
provinces and cities in the t-th year
The gray system model is characterized by less sample, 
high accuracy, and stability when predicted data(Ren et al, 
2016). Therefore, when predicting the carbon emissions 
of provinces and cities in 2020, the gray prediction model 
(GM(1,1)) is used for prediction. The specific steps of 
GM(1,1) can be borrowed from the work (Ye et al2018). 
The average percentage absolute error of each 
participant   can be calculated by the following formula 
(7):
 (7)
where  and  are the original sequence and forecast set, 
respectively. In addition, when<10%, the prediction has 
high accuracy (Lewis, 1982). 
1.2 Composite Indicator Method
The single indicator approach cannot integrate different 
allocation criteria, taking into account the different 
realities of the provinces and cities. Therefore, this 
study constructs a comprehensive indicator containing 
the principle of equality (represented by population 
indicators), efficiency (represented by GDP indicators) 
and feasibility (represented by historical CO2 emission 
indicators), and uses information entropy to assign 
weights to each single index.
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According to information entropy（IE）, this paper 
firstly determines the decision matrix Z for the distribution 
of three single indicators in 30 provinces and cities, 
namely:
                 (8)
The increment  represents the indicator value of the 
2020 provincial city i of the indicator j of the three single 
indicator allocations.
In order to facilitate comparison, the decision matrix is 
standardized. Since the above three indicators are positive 
indicators, the larger the value, the better. Therefore, the 
standardized formula is:
  (9)
represents the normalized value of the province i 
of the index j of the three single indicator assignments, 
and max and min  represent the maximum and 
minimum values  of the index j, respectively.
Therefore, the matrix Y after standardization is:
          (10)
Thus, the ratio of the indicator j of the province i is:
                 (11)
The entropy value  of the index j can be calculated by 
the following formula (12):
    (12)
Where n is the sum of all provinces and cities, where 
n=30.
The final information entropy weight value  of the 
index j is calculated by the formula (13)
           (13)
Where , the smaller the information 
entropy value, the greater the weight of the indicator.
The carbon credits of provinces and cities in 2020 are:
    (14)
1.3 Minimize Abatement Costs (MAC)
The marginal abatement cost of carbon dioxide is the 
cost of additionally reducing one unit of carbon dioxide. 
As the proportion of emission reduction increases, the 
difficulty of reducing emissions increases. Therefore, the 
marginal abatement cost has an increasing feature, while 
the marginal abatement cost curve It depicts the marginal 
abatement costs under different emission reduction ratios. 
This study selects the classic logarithmic form proposed 
by the famous economist Nordhaus. As follows:
           (15)
Where MC is the marginal abatement cost, and R is the 
emission reduction ratio. This paper follows the research 
of Fan et al. (2016) who estimated the MAC of China in 
2020.As follows:
     (16) 
The GDP indices from 2003 to 2005 were 114.8, 
114.8 and 113.8 (NBSC, 2017) respectively. The MAC of 
China’s constant price index in 2005 was equation (17):
     (17)
Under the condition of satisfying the total carbon quota 
constraint, this paper selects the appropriate emission 
reduction quotas of each province and city to minimize 
the national abatement cost. The model for minimizing 
abatement costs is as follows:
     s.t. 
，30                   （18） 
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Where TC is the total cost of national carbon dioxide 
emission reduction;  is the emission reduction of the i-th 
province, which is the decision-making variable; is the 
national total emission reduction. By solving the above 
planning model, the optimal allocation plan of the national 
emission reduction targets in each province can be obtained, 
thereby minimizing the national abatement cost.
1.4 Nash Negotiation (NN)
With the implementation of the Tokyo Agreement, carbon 
emission rights have become a scarce resource that can be 
traded (Jiang, 2017). Economic growth and emissions are 
incompatible, and economic growth will inevitably lead 
to an increase in carbon dioxide. To study the relationship 
between economic growth and carbon emissions, the 
environmental Kuznets curve (EKC curve) is widely used 
in academia (Dinda, 2004). Natural logarithm can reduce 
volatility and linearize its trend without changing the 
original integration relationship (Li, 2016), so this paper 
uses the natural logarithmic form of EKC. From a personal 
point of view, every participant with high GDP wants to 
expand its carbon assets through its contribution to the 
economy (Zhou, 2017). Since promoting economic growth 
is China’s top priority, a rational distribution method should 
be established on the principle of economic activity. In 
order to reflect the negotiation process between different 
participants, this paper uses the Nash negotiation model 
(Vartiainen，2007; Zhang，1995) and chooses GDP as 
the weight indicator. The Nash negotiation model is a non-
union cooperation game that can reflect the fairness of the 
negotiation process. At the same time, it ensures that each 
participant’s profits are better after negotiation (Yu, 2017) 
so that each participant is willing to join the negotiations. 
Since p is an exogenous variable and carbon allowances are 
risk neutral, maximizing incremental quotas is equivalent to 
maximizing carbon assets. The asset-oriented model (AM) 
is expressed as equation (19).
 (19)
 
where  represents the bargaining power (weight) of 
participant .
2. EMPIRICAL wORK
2.1 Data Description
The GDP, population, carbon dioxide emissions, and 
energy consumption of the provinces and districts from 
2005 to 2015 were selected. The relevant data were 
obtained from the China Statistical Yearbook and the 
China Energy Statistics Yearbook. Based on 2005, the 
GDP of each province is converted into GDP under the 
constant price of 2005 according to the GDP production 
index. In addition, the data of carbon dioxide emissions 
refer to the work (Shan, et al, 2018). Lacking of data 
in the Tibet Autonomous Region, 30 provinces and 
autonomous regions in mainland China were selected to 
participate in the calculation and distribution.
For input and output data of data envelopment 
analysis, capital stock, population, energy consumption, 
gross domestic product, and carbon dioxide emissions are 
selected. The capital stock is calculated by the calculation 
method of the perpetual inventory method adopted by 
Zhang Jun et al. (2010), in which the total fixed capital 
formation of each province comes from the China 
Statistical Yearbook.
The allocation of carbon emissions in 2020 requires 
the prediction of relevant data for 2020. According to the 
13th Five-Year Plan Document (2016-2020), the Chinese 
government plans to reduce its carbon dioxide emissions 
per unit of GDP by 18% from 2015 by 2020.
According to the “13th Five-Year” GDP growth target 
proposed by the provinces, the GDP in 2020 is predicted. 
Song Ding (2017) used the gray model’s non-gray model 
to predict China’s carbon emissions. The comparative 
analysis of the two models predicted that the gray model 
is more suitable for carbon emission prediction. Based 
on the 2005-2015 CO2 emissions data, a grayscale model 
is used to predict CO2 emissions in each province and 
region by 2020. This paper assumes that the population, 
capital stock, energy consumption and other indicators are 
generally consistent with the previous changes, according 
to the average growth rate, recursively get the 2020 value. 
2.2. Results and Discussion
According to China’s “13th Five-Year Plan” goal, the 
total carbon allowance for 2020 is 13660.97 million tons 
of standard coal. The distribution results under different 
allocation schemes are outlined in Table 3.
Among the distribution results of single indicators, 
based on population distribution, Guangdong Province 
has the highest distribution share, accounting for 7.89%, 
and Qinghai has the lowest distribution share, only 
0.43%. In the distribution based on population indicators, 
more carbon dioxide quotas are allocated in places with 
large populations. Among the distribution based on 
GDP, Jiangsu has the highest distribution share of 9.44% 
and Qinghai has the lowest share of 0.29%. Among 
the distribution of historical carbon dioxide emissions, 
Shanxi Province has the largest share of 11.06%. Shanxi 
Province is a large coal province with high carbon dioxide 
emissions. Hainan’s distribution ratio is only 0.51%, with 
the lowest distribution share.
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Table 2
Relevant Forecast Data for Various Provinces and Regions in 2020
Province GDP (billion yuan) CO2 emissions ( tons)
Capital stock 
(billion yuan) Population
Energy consumption ( tons 
of standard coal equivalent)
Beijing
Tianjin
Hebei
Shanxi
Inner mongolia
Liaoning
Jilin
Heilongjiang
Shanghai
Jiangsu
Zhejiang
Anhui
Fujian
Jiangxi
Shandong
Henan
Hubei
Hunan
Guangdong
Guangxi
Hainan
Chongqing
Sichuan
Guizhou
Yunnan
Shaanxi
Gansu
Qinghai
Ningxia
Xinjiang
23289.7
21037.2
36959.9
13961.8
20271.8
30016.2
15515.5
19360.1
30534.1
78267.7
48890.5
25246.0
31420.3
18615.3
76961.2
45195.1
32021.0
30943.4
84651.6
18129.0
3693.1
18133.5
32822.5
10402.7
15402.2
18230.8
7797.3
2410.6
2530.0
10056.2
91.60
172.19
793.79
1398.28
935.51
627.81
297.69
446.63
196.58
834.66
452.78
468.05
289.93
213.94
1252.83
748.05
327.12
334.44
730.79
243.06
60.60
187.80
421.21
358.04
236.87
597.18
209.00
61.61
206.71
466.22
15595.7
8228.7
22979.1
8285.3
5474.0
15938.7
7371.5
11833.0
22526.6
39312.5
27088.4
11771.7
14371.6
7784.6
39878.1
20735.0
17613.3
18389.7
38652.8
8058.0
2574.1
5703.9
12522.9
5623.4
9043.6
11103.3
4160.5
2068.2
2030.1
8487.2
23.8
18.3
76.6
37.5
25.5
43.8
27.6
37.8
25.0
80.7
56.4
63.7
39.9
46.6
101.2
96.0
59.7
70.2
112.9
49.9
9.5
31.4
84.0
36.1
48.8
38.6
26.4
6.1
7.1
25.6
76.3
124.1
368.3
248.5
259.3
285.3
109.0
153.0
132.2
407.3
245.2
175.3
173.8
119.4
467.1
290.2
216.7
202.1
385.6
140.7
29.7
124.9
267.9
135.2
149.4
172.2
103.6
68.6
78.5
293.1
Table 3
Allocation Results Using the Single Indicators Method
Province
Population indicator GDP indicator CO2 emission indicator
Q2020 Proportions Q2020 Proportions Q2020 Proportions
Beijing
Tianjin
Hebei
Shanxi
Inner mongolia
Liaoning
Jilin
Heilongjiang
Shanghai
Jiangsu
Zhejiang
Anhui
Fujian
Jiangxi
Shandong
Henan
Hubei
Hunan
Guangdong
Guangxi
Hainan
Chongqing
Sichuan
Guizhou
Yunnan
Shaanxi
Gansu
Qinghai
Ningxia
Xinjiang
212.65 
147.57 
740.91 
366.64 
252.26 
443.21 
277.96 
386.88 
242.14 
802.03 
555.34 
610.44 
381.61 
457.09 
983.83 
952.14 
586.02 
675.77 
1077.25 
476.76 
90.39 
299.88 
819.87 
353.44 
473.45 
380.42 
260.93 
58.41 
66.08 
229.61
1.56%
1.08%
5.42%
2.68%
1.85%
3.24%
2.03%
2.83%
1.77%
5.87%
4.07%
4.47%
2.79%
3.35%
7.20%
6.97%
4.29%
4.95%
7.89%
3.49%
0.66%
2.20%
6.00%
2.59%
3.47%
2.78%
1.91%
0.43%
0.48%
1.68%
413.74 
322.38 
641.57 
262.45 
337.46 
562.84 
275.63 
356.75 
543.53 
1289.75 
838.76 
393.51 
486.59 
289.39 
1273.42 
729.34 
486.94 
483.32 
1448.96 
298.82 
62.70 
255.58 
553.86 
146.90 
239.85 
290.87 
127.78 
39.44 
41.88 
166.99
3.03%
2.36%
4.70%
1.92%
2.47%
4.12%
2.02%
2.61%
3.98%
9.44%
6.14%
2.88%
3.56%
2.12%
9.32%
5.34%
3.56%
3.54%
10.61%
2.19%
0.46%
1.87%
4.05%
1.08%
1.76%
2.13%
0.94%
0.29%
0.31%
1.22%
110.58 
166.02 
783.64 
1511.55 
1001.83 
644.44 
300.13 
451.33 
206.27 
768.75 
475.05 
455.56 
266.94 
194.02 
1224.03 
710.33 
341.90 
323.98 
621.78 
224.29 
69.72 
178.39 
374.35 
373.03 
232.43 
623.79 
216.84 
75.06 
235.03 
499.88
0.81%
1.22%
5.74%
11.06%
7.33%
4.72%
2.20%
3.30%
1.51%
5.63%
3.48%
3.33%
1.95%
1.42%
8.96%
5.20%
2.50%
2.37%
4.55%
1.64%
0.51%
1.31%
2.74%
2.73%
1.70%
4.57%
1.59%
0.55%
1.72%
3.66%
Total 13660.97 100% 13660.97 100% 13660.97 100%
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Table 4
Allocation Results Using the Latter Three Method
Province
IE MAC NN
Q2020 Proportions Q2020 Proportions Q2020 Proportions
Beijing
Tianjin
Hebei
Shanxi
Inner mongolia
Liaoning
Jilin
Heilongjiang
Shanghai
Jiangsu
Zhejiang
Anhui
Fujian
Jiangxi
Shandong
Henan
Hubei
Hunan
Guangdong
Guangxi
Hainan
Chongqing
Sichuan
Guizhou
Yunnan
Shaanxi
Gansu
Qinghai
Ningxia
Xinjiang
211.26
180.19
761.58
820.98
588.83
577.13
261.83
394.06
313.20
1025.68
643.97
479.44
361.16
275.62
1277.38
828.59
457.81
476.25
1107.62
298.78
18.94
206.88
570.59
267.50
278.46
442.90
162.22
2.36
76.57
293.17
1.5%
1.3%
5.6%
6.0%
4.3%
4.2%
1.9%
2.9%
2.3%
7.5%
4.7%
3.5%
2.6%
2.0%
9.4%
6.1%
3.4%
3.5%
8.1%
2.2%
0.1%
1.5%
4.2%
2.0%
2.0%
3.2%
1.2%
0.0%
0.6%
2.1%
89.96
223.28
754.49
1229.66
931.44
556.91
275.38
440.47
189.74
812.98
430.14
559.91
336.60
221.45
1153.99
717.78
309.08
314.92
705.71
359.01
92.03
187.00
420.95
378.77
217.22
816.84
211.59
109.69
191.20
422.80
0.7%
1.6%
5.5%
9.0%
6.8%
4.1%
2.0%
3.2%
1.4%
6.0%
3.1%
4.1%
2.5%
1.6%
8.4%
5.3%
2.3%
2.3%
5.2%
2.6%
0.7%
1.4%
3.1%
2.8%
1.6%
6.0%
1.5%
0.8%
1.4%
3.1%
91.60
172.19
793.79
1398.28
935.51
627.81
297.69
446.63
196.58
834.66
452.78
468.05
289.93
213.94
1252.83
748.05
327.12
334.44
730.79
243.06
60.60
187.80
421.21
358.04
236.87
597.18
209.00
61.61
206.71
466.22
0.7%
1.3%
5.8%
10.2%
6.8%
4.6%
2.2%
3.3%
1.4%
6.1%
3.3%
3.4%
2.1%
1.6%
9.2%
5.5%
2.4%
2.4%
5.3%
1.8%
0.4%
1.4%
3.1%
2.6%
1.7%
4.4%
1.5%
0.5%
1.5%
3.4%
Total 13660.97 100% 13660.97 100% 13660.97 100%
Figure 1
Distribution results under six distribution methods
In the distribution based on information entropy, 
this paper weights the three indicators (population, 
GDP, historical carbon dioxide emissions) in the single 
indicator allocation, and then implements the distribution. 
The distribution results show that the distribution of 
Shandong Province and Guangdong Province ranks first 
and second, and the distribution of Qinghai is the least. 
The distribution based on information entropy is different 
from the distribution result of a single indicator because 
it takes into account various factors. Among the cost-
based allocations, Shanxi Province has the most quotas, 
accounting for 9.0%. Hainan and Beijing accounted for 
the least, at 0.7%. Due to the large emission reductions in 
Shanxi Province, the cost of abatement is large. In order to 
ensure the country’s total abatement costs are the smallest, 
provinces and cities with larger abatement costs allocate 
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more shares. According to calculations, Shanxi Province 
has the largest abatement cost, which is 51,766.40yuan / 
ton, so Shanxi Province has the most carbon allowance. In 
the distribution based on Nash negotiations, Shanxi and 
Shandong provinces have more carbon allowances, and 
Hainan Qinghai has fewer carbon allowances.
The final results of the distribution based on the six 
distribution methods are shown in Figure 1. There are 
significant differences in carbon allowances among the 
six provinces and cities under the six allocation schemes. 
Taking Beijing as an example, it allocates more according 
to the GDP indicator, and the carbon allowance based on 
the optimal cost and Nash negotiation is less.
3. COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION
In this part, the four indicators of abatement cost, 
efficiency, individual will, and fairness are selected to 
measure the results of the above scheme. The TOPSIS 
method is used to sort the schemes, and the advantages 
and disadvantages are compared.
3.1. Indicator Measure
In order to measure the cost of abatement and personal 
will, it is only necessary to bring the final allocation result 
to the relevant abatement cost equation and the Nash 
negotiation model.
The initial generation of the Lorenz curve was 
developed by scholars based on the question of whether 
the distribution between population and income was fair, 
and the curve was drawn according to the corresponding 
rules. Compared to the absolute fair line, observe the 
degree of curvature of the curve to determine whether 
the income distribution relationship is equal. The Gini 
coefficient is defined as: the area between the plotted 
income distribution curve and the assigned absolute 
fairness curve is A, and the area of the lower right area of 
the plotted income distribution curve is B. The quotient of 
dividing A by (A+B) indicates the degree of unfairness. 
For the Gini coefficient measurement, the value is: the 
value of the Gini coefficient is less than 0.2, indicating that 
the income is absolutely fair, 0.2-0.3 means the income is 
relatively average, 0.3-0.4 means the income is relatively 
fair, 0.4-0.5 means the income gap is larger, more than 0.5 
Explain that the income gap is very different
In order to examine the inter-provincial fairness of 
the distribution results, the Gini coefficient is used for 
measurement. The Gini coefficient is an indicator of the 
fairness of income distribution according to the Lorenz 
curve. This paper uses the Carbon-Gini coefficient to 
measure the fairness of carbon quota allocation. In this 
paper, the per capita carbon emissions are used as the 
basis for the Lorenz curve. The cumulative population 
ratio and cumulative carbon emissions ratio are taken as 
the horizontal and vertical coordinates, and the Lorentz 
curve of the initial allocation and redistribution of carbon 
emissions in each province in 2020 is obtained（figure 
2）.
Figure2
Lorenz curves under six distribution methods
according to the formula of the carbon Gini coefficient, 
the carbon Gini coefficients of the six distribution 
method are, 0, 0.1360, 0.2146, 0.1035, 0.1919, 0.2028, 
respectively. According to the basis of the Gini coefficient 
classification, the method based on historical emissions, 
popula t ion、GDP、  informat ion entropy、cost 
optimization、Nash negotiation are relatively average, 
especially the method based on population distribution is 
absolute average
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Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a technique for 
evaluating the efficiency of input and output. This paper 
selects population, capital stock, energy consumption as 
input variables, and GDP and CO2 emissions as output 
indicators. It tries to maximize the efficiency of a service 
unit by comparing the efficiency of a particular unit with 
the performance of a group of similar units that provide 
the same service. This paper analyzes the input and output 
of 30 provinces and cities through DEAP software and 
obtains the relative efficiency value. At the same time, we 
chose to use the average efficiency value of 30 provinces 
and cities as the DEA efficiency value of the six schemes
（Table 5）.Table 5 
DEA Efficient Value Under Six Distribution Methods
Province
Population
DEA efficient value
GDP Carbon emission IE MAC NN
Beijing
Tianjin
Hebei
Shanxi
Inner mongolia
Liaoning
Jilin
Heilongjiang
Shanghai
Jiangsu
Zhejiang
Anhui
Fujian
Jiangxi
Shandong
Henan
Hubei
Hunan
Guangdong
Guangxi
Hainan
Chongqing
Sichuan
Guizhou
Yunnan
Shaanxi
Gansu
Qinghai
Ningxia
Xinjiang
1
1
0.948
0.975
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0.972
0.984
1
0.971
1
0.978
0.975
1
0.975
0.954
1
1
0.993
0.982
0.969
1
0.935
0.915
0.876
1
1
0.674
0.628
1
0.847
0.921
0.765
1
0.965
0.941
0.826
0.932
0.911
0.854
0.88
0.763
0.74
1
0.877
0.633
1
0.986
0.574
0.638
0.643
0.652
0.416
0.405
0.423
1
1
0.691
1
1
0.785
0.925
0.827
1
0.999
0.963
0.923
0.939
0.926
0.959
0.942
0.788
0.768
1
0.831
0.733
1
0.852
0.726
0.669
0.846
0.659
0.428
0.824
0.497
1
1
0.722
1
1
0.814
0.897
0.841
1
1
0.975
0.961
0.933
0.959
0.97
0.99
0.789
0.799
1
0.879
0.619
1
0.943
0.742
0.708
0.825
0.662
0.402
0.467
0.496
1
1
0.692
1
1
0.746
0.911
0.831
1
0.995
0.94
0.992
0.952
0.937
0.947
0.946
0.771
0.756
1
0.907
0.825
1
0.863
0.758
0.66
1
0.663
0.495
0.737
0.477
1
1
0.695
1
1
0.783
0.922
0.831
1
1
0.948
0.927
0.938
0.93
0.961
0.948
0.774
0.76
1
0.837
0.7
1
0.862
0.728
0.668
0.845
0.659
0.413
0.783
0.496
Mean 0.98 0.797 0.85 0.846 0.86 0.847
The above allocation scheme is analyzed from four 
perspectives of cost, efficiency (DEA), individual will, 
and fairness. The individual will represent the expected 
income (displayed by GDP) between the provinces during 
the game. Thereby obtaining indicators under different 
allocation schemes, see Table 6.
Table 6
Indicator Measurement Under Six Distribution Methods
Method Cost(Billion yuan) Efficient Individual will Fairness
Population 1007125.79 0.98 39.57 0.00
GDP 1580566.65 0.797 52.81 0.136
Carbon emission 262328.64 0.85 100.05 0.2146
IE 648178.60 0.846 64.22 0.1035
MAC 166414.71 0.86 12.93 0.1919
NN 221148.41 0.847 101.96 0.2028
As can be seen from the above table, different 
schemes have advantages in the measurement 
values of the four indicators. In terms of a single 
population-based allocation indicator, it has the 
greatest advantage in efficiency and fairness, 
and has obvious disadvantages in terms of 
abatement costs.
3.2. Sorting of Allocation Schemes
Due to the different criteria considered in the allocation 
scheme, it is not possible to clearly compare the type 
of the scheme to be more dominant. This paper uses 
TOPSIS as a comprehensive evaluation method to obtain 
a comprehensive weight from four indicators.
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The TOPSIS method is an effective multi-index 
evaluation method (Lee, et al, 2018). The specific ideas 
are as follows:
(1)  Let  the  decis ion matr ix  ,  in 
order to avoid the decision type and the difference in 
the size of the attribute value, normalize the attribute 
value. Normalized decision matrix , 其中 
.
 (2)  Cons t ruc t  a  weighted  canonica l  mat r ix 
. Let the weight vector given by the 
decision maker , then
 (3) Determine the positive ideal solution C* and the 
negative ideal solution C0.
Where the benefit attribute means the bigger the better, 
the cost type attribute means the smaller the better.
(4) Calculate the distance from each scheme to the 
positive (negative) ideal solution
(5) Calculate the comprehensive evaluation value
The above four indicators are measured in a certain 
sense. In this paper, the same weights are given to the 
four indicators, and the distribution results under the four 
principles are weighted by the same weight 1/4, so that 
the comprehensive evaluation value is obtained.
Among the four indicators, abatement costs and 
fairness are cost-based indicators, meaning that the 
smaller the value, the better. Efficiency and personal 
willingness are efficiency indicators, meaning that the 
bigger the better. In order to ensure the consistency of the 
data, the data is homogenized and standardized. According 
to the comprehensive evaluation method of TOPSIS, 
the comprehensive evaluation values under the six 
distribution schemes were 0.3380, 0.2826, 0.6137, 0.4007, 
0.5138, and 0.6717, respectively. It can be seen from the 
comprehensive evaluation value that the Nash negotiation 
method ranks first, followed by historical emissions, cost 
optimization, information entropy, and population-based, 
while the GDP-based allocation scheme ranks the worst.
4 .  C O N C L U S I O N S  A N D  P O L I C Y 
IMPLICATIONS
4.1 Main Conclusions
In the long-term goal of addressing climate change, there 
is a series of carbon emission rights allocation programs. 
In order to achieve the participation of Chinese provinces, 
equity and efficiency are of paramount importance. In the 
study of carbon allocation, there are distribution schemes 
under different standards. In order to achieve the carbon 
emission reduction targets of China’s 13th Five-Year Plan, 
the decomposition of the total target is crucial. In the 
literature review, this paper includes equality (represented 
by population indicators), including benefits (represented 
by GDP), including feasibility (represented by historical 
CO2 emissions) in the single indicator method. In 
the composite index method, information entropy is 
represented. At the same time, in the optimization method, 
the cost is selected as the best. In addition, due to the 
importance of game theory among the subjects of carbon 
allocation, the Nash negotiation method is chosen.
The process of selecting four evaluation indicators 
takes into account efficiency, fairness, feasibility 
and individual will. The results show that the six 
distribution methods selected do not dominate the 
different index values. After applying the TOPSIS 
comprehensive evaluation method, it can be seen that 
the Nash negotiation distribution method has the highest 
score, which means that Nash negotiation has a greater 
advantage in comprehensively showing the cost of 
abatement, efficiency, fairness and personal will. The 
distribution method based on the single indicator of GDP 
has the lowest score. Since this indicator is too different 
from other schemes in the indicator of abatement cost, it 
affects its comprehensive score.
4.2 Policy Implications
Based on the above conclusions, this study has a certain 
impact on Chinese policy makers in order to achieve 
carbon emission reduction targets.
First, when Chinese policy makers allocate carbon 
allowances among different entities, using a single 
indicator (such as population, GDP, and historical carbon 
dioxide emissions), it may be difficult to reach consensus 
among different entities. Because there are large 
differences in the quotas allocated by different indicators 
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for different entities. Individual entities tend to choose 
distribution indicators that are beneficial to them.
Secondly,  compared with a  s ingle  indicator, 
the  comprehens ive  eva lua t ion  index  can  more 
comprehensively reflect the multiple negative standards, 
and is more easily accepted by various entities. Because 
under the comprehensive indicator allocation, the quota 
difference of each entity is relatively small. Therefore, 
according to the actual situation of different provinces and 
regions, choose the appropriate composite indicators for 
distribution
Third, whether it is a region with good economic 
deve lopment  o r  a  r eg ion  wi th  poor  economic 
development, in order to achieve the national emission 
reduction targets, there will inevitably be certain emission 
reduction costs. The generation of abatement costs will 
cause some provinces and cities to have some pressure to 
use clean production technology. In order to alleviate this 
pressure, policy makers must provide a good environment 
for production technology innovation, and provide 
corresponding policy concessions and corresponding laws 
and regulations.
Finally, the allocation of carbon credits involves 
bargaining between participating entities, and Nash 
negotiations consider whether the allocation is acceptable 
to each participating entity. Among the comprehensive 
evaluation indicators, the Nash negotiation model has 
the highest score, indicating that the allocation method 
can better consider various indicators. Therefore, policy 
makers should consider the ability of each participant to 
bargain in the initial allocation of carbon allowances so 
that the distribution plan can be more easily implemented.
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